Wed, 09 Jul 2008 13:37:37 BST CiteULike: heraclitus' fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/tag/fact-value-distinction CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/942701 <i>The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 1. (March 2005), pp. 105-113.</i> The Necessary Dichotomy of Fact and Value Goldthwait John doi:10.1007/s10790-006-7255-5 The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 1. (March 2005), pp. 105-113. 2006-11-14T09:37:06-00:00 2005 The Journal of Value Inquiry 0022-5363 39 1 105 113 Springer critique fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2782081 <i>Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 100, No. 01. (2007), pp. 1-9.</i> Ethics and Scholarship David Little Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 100, No. 01. (2007), pp. 1-9. 2008-05-10T00:21:37-00:00 2007 Harvard Theological Review 100 01 1 9 fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/1158182 <i>Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 1. (1 March 2007), pp. 74-84.</i><br /><br />Hilary Putnam makes two related points in his recent collection of essays: (1) Values can be rational, and their inescapable intrusion into every kind of discourse is welcome. (2) Ignoring or suppressing this fact is common yet irrational. This is of course true; yet the intrusion in question can be trivial, and it can be problematic. Putnam ignores this here. The book is pleasant to read; it is infused with friendly and appreciative personal anecdotes and observations. It is almost entirely critical and almost always in a friendly way. Yet it is often unclear. In almost every discussion here, the author announces one item and discusses another almost identical with it but one much easier to discuss. 10.1177/0048393106296570 What Collapse, Exactly? Joseph Agassi doi:10.1177/0048393106296570 Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 1. (1 March 2007), pp. 74-84. 2007-03-13T10:57:58-00:00 2007 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 1 74 84 critique fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2782078 <i></i> The Two Dogmas of Neoclassical Economics Steven Pressman 2008-05-10T00:17:15-00:00 economics fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2646708 <i>(30 March 2004)</i><br /><br /><p> If philosophy has any business in the world, it is the clarification of our thinking and the clearing away of ideas that cloud the mind. In this book, one of the world's preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical thought: the idea that while factual claims can be rationally established or refuted, claims about value are wholly subjective, not capable of being rationally argued for or against. Although it is on occasion important and useful to distinguish between factual claims and value judgments, the distinction becomes, Hilary Putnam argues, positively harmful when identified with a dichotomy between the objective and the purely "subjective." </p><p> Putnam explores the arguments that led so much of the analytic philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology to become openly hostile to the idea that talk of value and human flourishing can be right or wrong, rational or irrational; and by which, following philosophy, social sciences such as economics have fallen victim to the bankrupt metaphysics of Logical Positivism. Tracing the problem back to Hume's conception of a "matter of fact" as well as to Kant's distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments, Putnam identifies a path forward in the work of Amartya Sen. Lively, concise, and wise, his book prepares the way for a renewed mutual fruition of philosophy and the social sciences. </p> The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays Hilary Putnam (30 March 2004) 2008-04-09T17:55:53-00:00 2004 Harvard University Press fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2782016 <i>The Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 3. (2003), pp. 357-375.</i><br /><br />Abstract The paper addresses the problem of the conceptualisation of morality in sociology. The traditional sociological conception of morality was based upon the acceptance of a fact/value dichotomy, implying that sociology portrays the factual nature of morality, which thereby becomes equivalent to group conformity The opposition of fact and value was brought into question by trends of thought that followed from, respectively, Alfred Schutz and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The line from Schutz's ideas led towards their reformulation by Harold Garfinkel, who to large extent integrated the 'moral' with the 'cognitive'. Wittgenstein's influence, through, especially Peter Winch, John W. Cook and Alfred Louch undercut the idea that sociological descriptions were themselves purely factual, rather than integrally evaluative. A third stream is represented by Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, who adopt the idea that morality must be understood in its social and historical context, and explicitly reject the separation of fact and value in moral inquiry. The fact/value distinction is the source of chronic problems for the sociology of morality. Specifically, a sociological account of morality, that would define the correct understanding of the nature of morality - ie identify what substantive character and content is appropriate to it - is not possible. The disintegration of the fact/value dichotomy also means that the idea that the social context can itself be described independently of normative considerations is an illusion. The rise and fall of the fact/value distinction Irina Davydova Wes Sharrock doi:10.1111/1467-954X.00425 The Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 3. (2003), pp. 357-375. 2008-05-09T23:48:39-00:00 2003 The Sociological Review 51 3 357 375 fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2770993 <i>Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 03. (2007), pp. 365-372.</i><br /><br />Social thinkers frequently remind us that people differ on what constitutes personal well-being, but that even when they don't differ, they disagree over the extent to which one person's well-being can be permitted to be traded off against another's. They tell us that political differences are to be traced to differences in people's conceptions of personal and social well-being. We are given to understand, in other words, that people's <em>ethics</em> differ. REPLY TO PUTNAM AND WALSH Partha Dasgupta Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 03. (2007), pp. 365-372. 2008-05-08T12:21:25-00:00 2007 Economics and Philosophy 23 03 365 372 economics ethics fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2770988 <i>Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 03. (2007), pp. 359-364.</i><br /><br />The present note will be concerned only with Sir Partha Dasgupta's recent article in this journal (Dasgupta 2005). What is more, it will concentrate on those parts of the article which contain a serious misreading of Hilary Putnam's position on the entanglement of facts, theories and values. These philosophical matters can perhaps be clarified for economist readers (they should require no clarification for philosophers) by considering, to begin with, Dasgupta's interpretation of the Bergson–Samuelson position. What (Bergson) Burk (1938) and Samuelson (1947) were doing, according to Dasgupta, was to establish ‘the ethical foundations of the subject. . .over five decades ago’ (Dasgupta 2005: 221–2).² Thus a major theme of the article is heard at once: economics is supposedly based on sound <em>ethical foundations</em>, and these can be traced (it is supposed) to specific work written long ago, and hence needing no augmentation. These ethical foundations, it is claimed, ‘are now regarded to be a settled matter’ (2005: 222). A RESPONSE TO DASGUPTA Hilary Putnam Vivian Walsh Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 03. (2007), pp. 359-364. 2008-05-08T12:20:08-00:00 2007 Economics and Philosophy 23 03 359 364 economics ethics fact-value-distinction http://www.citeulike.org/user/heraclitus/article/2770934 <i>Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 02. (2003), pp. 329-349.</i> Why did the economist cross the road? The hierarchical logic of ethical and economic reasoning Andrew Yuengert Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 02. (2003), pp. 329-349. 2008-05-08T11:56:19-00:00 2003 Economics and Philosophy 18 02 329 349 economics ethics fact-value-distinction virtue-ethics