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Evolutionary game theory and the normative theory of institutional design: Binmore and behavioral economicsby: Don Ross
Politics Philosophy Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1 February 2006), pp. 51-79.
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AbstractIn this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the scale-relativity' considerations built into Binmore's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend Binmore's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent (respective) work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism (broadly conceived) and what Binmore calls whiggery' as normative political programs. 10.1177/1470594X06060619
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