Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

by: Joshua D Greene, Sylvia A Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E Nystrom, Jonathan D Cohen

Cognition, Vol. 107, No. 3. (June 2008), pp. 1144-1154.

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Abstract

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.

@article{citeulike:2754903, abstract = {Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.}, author = {Greene, Joshua D. and Morelli, Sylvia A. and Lowenberg, Kelly and Nystrom, Leigh E. and Cohen, Jonathan D. }, citeulike-article-id = {2754903}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004}, journal = {Cognition}, keywords = {cogsci}, month = {June}, number = {3}, pages = {1144--1154}, posted-at = {2008-05-05 03:35:21}, priority = {2}, title = {Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004}, volume = {107}, year = {2008} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2754903 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2754903 TI - Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment JF - Cognition VL - 107 IS - 3 SP - 1144 EP - 1154 N2 - Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically. KW - cogsci AU - Greene, Joshua AU - Morelli, Sylvia AU - Lowenberg, Kelly AU - Nystrom, Leigh AU - Cohen, Jonathan PY - 2008/06// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 ER -

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