Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

@article{cripps-mailath-samuelson-2004, abstract = {We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.}, author = {Cripps, Martin W. and Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry }, citeulike-article-id = {1920064}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {412-1, reputations}, number = {2}, pages = {407--432}, posted-at = {2007-11-15 08:01:53}, priority = {2}, title = {Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598908}, volume = {72}, year = {2004} }

TY - JOUR ID - cripps-mailath-samuelson-2004 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1920064 TI - Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations JF - Econometrica VL - 72 IS - 2 SP - 407 EP - 432 N2 - We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. KW - 412-1 KW - reputations AU - Cripps, Martin AU - Mailath, George AU - Samuelson, Larry PY - 2004/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598908 ER -